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Scepticism, Eclecticism and the Enlightenment
An Inquiry Into the Political Philosophy of Denis
Diderot
Denis Diderot's thought is instructive for contemporary students 
of moral theory for it faces head on the challenge of moral 
scepticism. Diderot argues that a need for psychological 
consistency and a demand for the recognition of dignity are 
resistant to the corrosive force of scepticism. Thus, rather 
than signaling the Enlightenment's coming to an impasse in its 
ability to justify an ethics - as he is often interpreted - 
Diderot instead shows a way out of doubt through a mitigated 
scepticism, or eclecticism.
According to general accounts of the history of 
scepticism, scepticism was rediscovered in the 
sixteenth century Renaissance, grew in importance, 
from the religious debates between Erasmus and Luther, 
through the writings of Montaigne and Charron, and 
culminated with the attempts of Descartes - and the
attending criticisms of his efforts to defeat
scepticism once and for all. By the 18th century,
scepticism had lost its influence, and with the 
exception of David Hume, and a few obscure thinkers in 
France, the optimism of the Age of Reason of the 
Enlightenment had triumphed.1 Now, this historical 



























































































scepticism is becoming acknowledged as a significant 
influence on numerous 18th Century French thinkers, 
ranging from Brissot and Condillac to Rousseau.2 But 
Diderot has not yet been included on this list.3 It is 
important to examine Diderot's scepticism, not only to 
further set the historical record straight - and 
further demonstrate the importance of scepticism in the 
18th century - but more importantly, because Diderot's 
exploration of the limits of scepticism are 
particularly relevant to contemporary moral reflection.
Ancient vs. Modern Scepticism
For the ancient Pyrrhonists, the goal of 
scepticism was a negative, therapeutic one. Claiming 
that belief about good and evil was the prime source of 
human suffering, the Pyrrhonists used doubt to 
demonstrate the uncertainty and irreconcilable 
opposition of all belief. They thought that by freeing 
themselves from all opinion, they would come to a state 
of suspended judgement (epoche) and then inner 




























































































the writings of Sextus Empiricus in the early sixteenth 
century, scepticism came to be used for a much wider 
range of goals. One important current of scepticism 
followed the Pyrrhonist's negative orientation, in its 
emphasis on the powerlessness of reason. From 
Montaigne, to Charron and later to Pascal, scepticism 
was used to undermine reason: to demonstrate the 
uncertainty of all opinion, the utter powerlessness of 
reason, and so point one into the arms of the Church. 
In the absence of reason, Faith became indispensable, 
for it was the only trustworthy guide.
At the same time, scepticism was also used to 
strengthen reason rather than undermine it: doubt was 
now to be a point of departure rather than a 
destination. This positive orientation of doubt took a 
number of forms. It appeared as a "mitigated 
scepticism" in the thought of Gassendi and Mersenne, 
and Locke as well - all of whom claimed that while we 
cannot have absolute certainty about the real nature of 
things, we can form more modest hypotheses about the 
world, and while doubting our abilities to find grounds 




























































































knowledge itself.4 It also took another more extreme 
form in the methodological scepticism of Bacon and 
above all, in Descartes, a method with which to find 
not probability, but rather absolute certainty: "to 
cast aside the loose earth and sand so as to come upon 
rock or clay."5
Diderot was influenced by all of these currents of 
scepticism. He followed the Cartesian approach to 
philosophical method, saying in his first published 
writings, and in his very last words before he died, 
that "scepticism is the first step towards truth."(II. 
p. 35).6 But unlike Descartes, his scepticism reminded 
him of the limited powers of reason, and, at times, 
also made him pessimistic about the possibility of 
moral improvement. For while Diderot believed in 
scientific and moral progress, writing in the 
Prospectus of the Encyclopédie that its goal was to 
"contribute to the certitude and to the progress of 
human knowledge" to "fill society with new benefits"(V. 
p.104), besides this Enlightenment optimistic zeal he 
also cautioned that "he who would announce to know all 




























































































human mind. " (V. p. 92) On other occasions, he 
pessimistically describes reason as a "feeble light", 
(IX. p. 88) and more ominously writes that attempts to 
enlighten mankind are like trying to "introduce a ray 
of light into an owl's nest: It is useless but to hurt 
their eyes and excite their cries.(II. p.78) Like Kant, 
who claimed that man is made out of ever crooked 
timber, all the while hoping for the possibility of 
perpetual peace, Diderot affirmed both faith and 
pessimism about the progress of science.7
Yet Diderot's scepticism did not make him entirely 
pessimistic about the possibility of knowledge, nor its 
edifying function. His scepticism still had an
underlying positive role, one closer to that of the 
mitigated doubt of a Mersenne or Gassendi than the more 
destructive doubt of a Charron or Pascal. To be sure, 
unlike these mitigated sceptics, and unlike Descartes, 
for whom epistemological doubt was fundamental, Diderot 
was not interested in epistemological scepticism, for 
he claimed these questions far too removed from 
practical life:
Are there no other truths to look for or to resolve? Let us 
busy ourselves with something more important; or if we have 





























































































Rather than to epistemology, the sceptic should 
dedicate himself to ethics and politics: Diderot 
claimed that were he forbidden to write about religion 
and politics, he would have nothing left to say.9 
Nonetheless, Diderot agreed with the mitigated 
sceptics that doubt does not paralyze; while it is 
sobering and occasionally may lead one to despair, it 
still allows for investigation, but this inquiry will 
be based upon probability not Cartesian certainty.
The Encyclopédie, to which Diderot dedicated over 
twenty five years of his life, reflected this 
mitigated scepticism. While it followed the geometric 
ideal of mathematical order in holding that all human 
knowledge is interconnected, it did not aspire to the 
precision of geometry. To the contrary, Diderot 
acknowledged that we are too intellectually feeble to 
see the truth whole, writing "we will always only be 
able to understand but a portion of the universe," (V. 
p. 106) and so the best we can do is to hope for a 
conjectural or probabilistic knowledge, one that we can 




























































































and showing the interconnections among all the 
individual sciences.10
Scepticism and Eclecticism.
Still, the goal of the Encyclopédie was not just
to disseminate a body of knowledge. It was also to
instill a new way of thinking, to "teach mankind how to
doubt" by challenging prejudice, convention and common »
opinion.(VII. p.221) Diderot describes his ideal of the 
doubting thinker as one "who tramples underfoot 
prejudices, tradition, antiquity, universal assent, 
authority, in a word everything that overawes the mass 
of minds, who dares to think for himself." (VII. p. 35) 
Sometimes Diderot calls this free thinker a sceptic, 
but he also describes him as an eclectic, primarily in 
order distinguish this thinker from the ancient 
sceptics, whose method of doubting he did not wholly 
approve.
According to Diderot, the eclectic is 
distinguished above all by the fact that he is neither 




























































































to any established school of thought. Diderot traces 
the history of eclecticism to Diogenes Laertius' 
characterization of a sect of philosophers established 
by Potamon of Alexandria in the second century after 
Christ. But the history here is not what is important 
- Diderot copied it from the historian Brucker, and it 
includes such diverse thinkers as Bacon, Hobbes, 
Leibniz and Descartes, who did not self-characterize 
themselves as eclectics. Rather, what is of interest 
here is the method of thinking Diderot expounds. 
Fundamental to Diderot's eclectic is his intellectual 
independence and probity. The eclectic does not belong 
to any particular school of thought - for to follow 
anyone's intellectual lead is a sign of dogmatism, a 
lack of questioning. The eclectic, instead, is the 
rigorous thinker who examines all competing 
philosophical doctrines to see what elements of truth 
they do contain.11
Diderot does acknowledge similarities between his 
ideal of the free thinker and the ancient Pyrrhonist. 
He notes that the Greek word skeptikos means one who 




























































































Diderot clearly refers to Sextus' introduction in his 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism, where Sextus tells us that the 
sceptic is distinguished from all other philosophers 
precisely by the fact that he seeks to avoid dogmatism, 
that unlike all other philosophers, the sceptic neither 
categorically denies nor affirms truth, but rather, 
"keeps on searching."12 And so Diderot writes that 
scepticism is "the touchstone of eclecticism," and 
that, like the eclectic, the sceptic shares the 
following principle: "not to be obliged to accept the
word of any master."(VII. p. 36)
But Diderot faults the ancient sceptic for using 
his doubt for solely a destructive purpose. The 
eclectic free thinker, to the contrary, is to walk side 
by side with the sceptic, in order to pick up 
everything that his companion "has not reduced to dust 
by the severity of his inquiries." (Vol. VII. p. 37) 
And this is not merely a matter of psychological 
orientation - whether scepticism is wielded for a 
destructive or constructive purpose - but more
importantly, a question of intellectual probity. For 




























































































scepticism is fundamentally based upon a dogmatic, 
unexamined premise. The Pyrrhonists claim that all 
inquiry culminates with suspension of judgement because 
there are equally convincing opposing arguments on both 
sides of any question. But this assumption is 
dogmatic: it might also be true that the conflict of
opinion is only apparent, or superficial, and that 
instead of making judgement impossible, it may sharpen 
it. And so, unlike the Pyrrhonist, the eclectic does 
not automatically suspend judgement, but to the 
contrary, tries to keep on searching, to see what can 
be learned from the conflict of opinion.13 Or as 
Diderot claims, suspicious about the utter 
powerlessness of reason, the eclectic does not 
ultimately suspend judgement, because he is guided by 
one further principle: "no philosopher is mad enough
not to discern some element of the truth."(VII. p. 39) 
Diderot is also a perspicacious critic of 
Pyrrhonism in noting that its method is disingenuous: 
for he realizes that the Pyrrhonists hold to their 
principle of equipollence - that for every opinion 




























































































irreconcilable one - because they are above all 
interested in the goal of tranquility rather than a 
consistently rigorous examination of the truth.14 The 
Pyrrhonist does not expend great effort in examining 
the particulars of conflicting opinion, he does not, as 
Diderot notes, "render justice to his adversaries."(IX. 
p. 81) For the Pyrrhonist's tranquility depends on 
freeing himself from all opinion, the purging of all 
argument. And this freedom is possible only if the 
Pyrrhonist is convinced that there will always be an 
irreconcilable opposite for every belief he examines 
and no way to arbitrate between them.
Diderot claims that if the ancient sceptic were 
made honest, then he would be no different from his 
ideal free thinking eclectic: "make the Pyrrhonist 
sincere, and you will have a [genuine] sceptic."(II. p. 
28) This kind of sceptic would be "a philosopher who 
doubts everything he believes, and who believes what 
the legitimate use of his reason and of his senses 
demonstrates to be true."(II. p.29) But what is the 
"legitimate use of reason"? How does Diderot's




























































































methodological scepticism, the honest sceptic's, or 
eclectic's inquiry? First, Diderot claims scepticism 
has a psychological effect. Despite its excesses, 
Pyrrhonism provides a valuable lesson for the 18th 
century eclectic, because it promotes intellectual 
modesty: "upon leaving their school one must consider 
with a great deal of circumspection the things one had 
believed to understand."(III. p. 149) Scepticism will 
tend to make one more cautious, and far less inclined 
to make hasty and precipitate judgments. Such caution, 
Diderot hopes, will combat egoism, pride and obstinacy 
by "tempering in all the impetuosity of the 
passions."(Ill. p. 149)
This scepticism affects not only the scope of 
inquiry, but also its methodology. It makes Diderot 
aware not just that probability, not certainty is the 
best we can hope for, but also makes him suspicious of 
any kind of attempts at philosophical system building, 
or scientific reductionism, for he realizes the world 
is so complex, so full of uncertainty that any such 
narrow systematic or reductive approach will inevitably 




























































































criticized both Rousseau and Hobbes. In the
Encyclopédie article "Hobbisme", Diderot contrasts the 
conceptions of human nature found in Hobbes and 
Rousseau, and while praising the two philosophers, 
faults them for being extreme - in overly emphasizing 
but one aspect of human nature and, as a result, 
building their political theories on skewed 
foundations. Of Hobbes, Diderot writes "he had the 
fault of systematic thinkers, that is of generalizing 
from particular facts and skillfully bending them to 
fit his hypothesis."(VII. p.232) Diderot cautions that 
the truth may be somewhere in between the way Hobbes 
and Rousseau describe it, (and though he is not being 
entirely fair in his representations of either of these 
thinkers) he argues that natural man is neither solely 
good nor entirely wicked: “between their two systems
there is another which may convey the truth:...although 
the human condition is one of perpetual strife, man's 
goodness and wickedness remain constant, his happiness 





























































































Similarly, in his dialogue Jacques le Fatalist, he 
shows how the rigid application of science to ethics 
may further lead to distortion of moral phenomena. The 
main character of the dialogue, Jacques, preaches a 
doctrine of scientific determinism: "if it is written
up there, it shall occur down here." But though 
Jacques' theory does not allow for the either freedom 
or moral responsibility, he still does not act in 
accordance with this determinism. Instead, he "behaved 
for the most part just as you and I. He thanked his 
benefactors so that they would continue to help him. He 
got angry at wrongdoers."(XXIII. p. 33) And, so at the 
end of the dialogue, Jacques admits that "we remain 
human and react as human beings despite our 
theories."(XXIII. p. 78) Diderot again points to a 
sceptical suspicion of any kind of explanation that 
tries to explain all human behavior - particularly 
ethical behavior on he basis of one principle. 
Moreover, his scepticism cautions that we should always 
ask whether a method is adequate to its subject matter 
- and in the case of science, whether it may even be 




























































































A true man will not have two philosophies, one for the study and 
another for society. He will never establish principles that he 
will be forced to forget in practice.(VIII. p.160)
Thus Diderot helps us think about what kinds of 
justifications and what kind of certainty we might 
expect from ethics. Contemporary observers across the 
ideological spectrum - whether it is Leo Strauss, 
Hannah Arendt, Charles Taylor or Richard Rorty - all 
complain that reductive mechanical interpretations of 
nature, and the appropriation of such paradigms to 
ethics, impoverish moral discourse.15 Diderot - far 
closer to the Cartesian revolution in science than we 
are - reminds us that scepticism should make our aims 
in ethics more modest ones - that we should be 
suspicious of either systematic or reductive ethical 
explanations, and that we should not look for 
mathematical certainty in ethical matters.
What, then, does scepticism teach Diderot about 
ethics? What will Diderot's constructive sceptic - or 
eclectic, have left to pick up after his questioning? 
Diderot spent a lifetime meditating on this question, 
for he was acutely aware of the challenge scepticism 
posed to morality: "but if good and evil are nothing in 




























































































nor life at all."(III. p. 149) And because Diderot and 
the other philosophes wanted to free man from the 
intellectual oppression of the Church, it was 
especially important that they respond to these 
sceptical doubts. For while morality had previously 
been underwritten by religious authority, now it was to 
stand alone, grounded in human reason. And many in the 
Church claimed that reason was impotent to such a task, 
that a secular philosophy would destroy morality and 
undermine society.16 They asked, as Thomas Carlyle 
later wrote in a polemical essay attacking Diderot: 
"since there is nothing sacred in the universe, whence 
this sacredness of what you call virtue?"17 Moreover, 
they held that eventually scepticism would point one 
back to the moral security of the Church, agreeing with 
Pascal that "Pyrrhonism is the handmaid of 
religion. 1,1819 And so, the philosophes were faced with 
the task of disproving this charge, or as Diderot wrote 
in a famous letter to Voltaire, "it is not enough to 
know more than they [those of the Church] do: it is
necessary to show them that we are better and that 




























































































efficacious grace. 20 To what extent Diderot succeeded
we can gauge by considering his greatest work, Rameau's 
Nephew.
Rameau's Nephew
Nothing has ever appeared to me more spiritual and 
more daring, more immorally moral.
-Goethe
Rameau's Nephew is the work which ought to 
rightfully secure Diderot a preeminent place in the 
history of philosophy. The dialogue has a curious
history, for Diderot never published it in his
lifetime, nor is there any mention of it in his
voluminous correspondence. It was first published in
Germany, in a translation by Goethe who w$s sent the
discovered manuscript by Schiller.21 Immediately 
recognizing its merit, Schiller esteemed Diderot "an 
inextinguishable flame", while Goethe deemed Rameau a 
masterpiece that "explodes upon the scene of French 
literature", and immediately set to work upon its 
translation.22 Despite their praise, it was Hegel who 




























































































historical and philosophical significance. For in his 
Phenomenology, in several lengthy references to the 
dialogue, Hegel enshrines Rameau as a work of 
exceptional importance, as a paradigm of the modern 
spiritual and cultural situation.23 In it, Hegel saw 
the exact portrait of his pronouncements on the self- 
alienation of Spirit, the disintegration of 
consciousness, and the dialectic between master and 
slave in a decaying culture from which authentic 
revolutionary conscience would arise.24
Although we need not accept Hegel's superimposing 
a historical dialectic onto his reading of the 
dialogue, we can take Hegel's question as our point of 
departure:
If all prejudice and superstition have been banished, the 
question arises, What next? What is the truth Enlightenment has 
propagated in their stead?(Phenomenology, 557)
Or in Diderot's words, what is the eclectic left with 
after the sceptic has completed his questioning?
Rameau's Nephew is a dialogue between two 
characters. One is a philosopher, the other, Rameau, 
nephew of the famous French composer, a professional 




























































































rich. The philosopher tries to convince his 
interlocutor, Rameau, of the errors of his ways, 
claiming that the life of virtue is the only happy 
life. But.Rameau is not easily convinced. He objects to 
the philosopher that this equation is an implausible 
one: "I can see countless good people who are not
happy, and countless happy ones who are not good.“(XII. 
p.118) And he challenges not merely the efficacy of 
virtue, but also the philosopher's definitions of 
virtue and happiness. He is sceptical about the 
definition of virtue, saying "if we came to a clear 
understanding, it might turn out that what you call 
vice I call virtue and what I call vice you call 
virtue."(XII. p. 139) And he is equally sceptical about 
the philosopher's conception of happiness, arguing 
instead, that there are many rival incommensurable 
conceptions of the ordering of life:
You think that happiness is the same for all. What a strange 
illusion! Your own brand presupposes a certain romantic turn of 
mind that we don't all possess... You dignify this oddity with 
the name of virtue and you call it philosophy. But are virtue 
and philosophy made for everybody? (XII. p.114)
Rameau, in fact, is sceptical about a coherent idea
of morality at all, saying that "in a matter a




























































































absolutely, essentially, universally true or
false.'(XII. p.139)
Rameau is not merely sceptical, he is also 
cynical. He says that what really counts in the
world is not ethics but rather merely appearance. 
Hypocrisy rules the world: what is essential is to
seem ethical, not to actually be virtuous: "evil only
upsets people now and then, but the visible signs of 
evil hurt them from morning till night. "(XII. p.120) 
Moreover, morality in fact, is merely window-
dressing, a disguise for power. Rameau writes, "from 
pole to pole all I see are tyrants and slaves." (XII. 
p.114)
And so, Rameau lives as an unscrupulous hedonist, 
following his motto "never false as long as it is in 
my interest to be true; never true if I see the 
slightest use of being false" and claims that the only 
goal in life is "to drink good wine, gorge oneself on 
fine food, lie upon pretty women, lie in a nice soft 
bed, except for that, all is vanity."(XII. p.114) But 
his hedonism and his ethical nihilism are the result 




























































































certainties that Rameau seems able to find are power 
and pleasure.
Rameau's outbursts appear to leave the 
philosopher helpless. Or, as Hegel interprets the 
dialogue, the philosopher is reduced to mere chatter. 
What is worse, the philosopher admits that he has to 
respect Rameau for his honesty. At least Rameau is no 
hypocrite and desires to act consistently, acnowledging 
his ruthlessness. From this point Hegel illustrates his 
analysis of disintegrating consciousness, of how the 
noble-minded consciousness decays through flattery and 
its eventual pursuit of wealth to become 
indistinguishable from base consciousness. But though 
it may accurately describe the decay of the ancien 
regime in 18 th century France, we need not invoke 
Hegel's dialectical analysis to understand why the 
philosopher is unable to respond to Rameau.
Instead, the answer lies in the momentous shifts 
in the conceptions of nature in the 18th century. For 
the abandonment of religious justifications of morality 
combined with the effects of the scientific 




























































































attempts to justify what human beings ought to do 
deeply problematic.25 One can trace this gradual 
realization in Diderot's thoughts from his early 
article "Droit Naturel" in the first volume of the 
Encyclopédie, to the final outbursts of Rameau.26 In 
his article Droit Naturel, while asserting that the 
question of natural right is "of all our moral concepts 
one of the most important", Diderot also finds it to be 
"one of the most difficult to specify", and in fact is 
unable to come up with a satisfactory answer precisely 
because of his unsettling doubts about the stability of 
nature, and so its capacity to underwrite any normative 
ethical standard.(VII. p. 25) Parallel to Rousseau's 
historicization of nature, and the consequent 
undercutting of nature as an ethical standard in his 
thought, Diderot finds no ground in nature to stand as 
the foundation for natural right. Instead, he attempts 
to defend natural right as merely the expression of a 
global general will, with the result that, like in 





























































































Diderot further attempts to defend nature as an 
ethical standard through his explorations of science, 
even claiming it impossible to "establish a morality 
without being an anatomist, naturalist, physiologist 
and physician."(XI. p. 514) For Diderot considered that 
perhaps science could come up with an answer to the 
question what is the nature of man. But here again he 
comes upon the dilemma of making binding normative 
arguments out of "natural" standards in the absence of 
any agreed upon final causes in nature. In D'Alembert's 
Dream, Diderot admits that without teleology, science 
is left only with description: "man is merely a common
phenomenon while a monster is only a rare phenomenon, 
but both are equally natural."(XVII. p.202)
Exasperated by the difficulties raised by science 
for morality, Diderot once wrote: "I rage at being
entangled in a devil of a philosophy that my mind can't 
help approving and my heart belying." And because of 
this comment, Rameau's Nephew is sometimes interpreted 
as a full blown expression of nihilism, the final 
logical working out of the apparent contradiction in 




























































































the case of virtue, while Rameau destructively appeals 
to the lessons of science as the apology for his 
complete denials of all ethical standards.28 It is 
claimed that alone of the 18th century philosophes, 
Diderot had the perspicuity to realize that the 
Enlightenment project of rationally justifying morality 
had ground to a halt, that he saw that the 
mechanization of nature had left the philosophes with a 
"quixotic" task in their efforts to construct an 
ethics.29 And because Diderot did not publish Rameau's 
Nephew, it is inferred that he did so for strictly 
prudential reasons, that he must have been aware the 
dialogue would be an apology for evil.30 But these 
pronouncements are unduly dark - and do not give 
sufficient weight to Diderot's avowal in the 
Encyclopédie, that the constructive sceptic, or in his 
terminology, the eclectic's, chief task is to see what 
scepticism leaves uncorroded.
The Limits of Doubt
Rameau boasts that he lives on the basis of the 




























































































to be true; never true if I see the slightest use of 
being false." But he fails at his own game: he is 
thrown out of the house where he serves as resident 
jester. Diderot's lesson is not merely that this sort 
of Machiavellian nihilism is not for the weak nor 
foolish. Certainly, there are elements of this sort 
of moralizing in Diderot's writings - Jacques the 
Fatalist is full of tales of people trying to live by 
Rameau's tenets and failing miserably. A man who 
tries to steal a baker's wife by denouncing her 
husband with a lettre de cachet ends up himself 
caught out. Another intends to run off with his maid, 
and so betrays his wife - signing over all his 
positions to his lover. His lover then swindles him, 
defrauds him of all his property, and leaves him in 
debtor's jail. But Diderot does not merely teach that 
crime does not pay; he also points to the limits of 
scepticism. For despite his denials of all moral 
distinctions, that all is hypocrisy and a 
masquerading of power, Rameau is less able to escape 




























































































The dialogue begins with an epigram from Horace: 
"Born under the malign influence of all the
Vertumnes." The Vertumnes were gods of the changing 
of the seasons. In Horace the description refers to 
an unstable, ever changing Roman Senator.31 And
Diderot uses the epigram to refer to the chaotic, 
unstable nature of Rameau as well, whom he introduces 
as "a mixture of noble and base, of good sense and 
madness", one who sees the moral realm as completely 
chaotic, in whose mind "the notion of honesty and 
dishonesty are strangely jumbled together."(XII p. 
70) Rameau says "I know nothing", and "devil take me 
if I know who I really am. "(XII. p. 132, 139) He
doubts the possibility of any rational morality, and 
not merely doubts, but holds to a dogmatic nihilistic 
denial of all moral distinctions. And so he lives as
the thorough pantomime, taking on whatever role
serves his interest: "one has to be whatever self-
interest decrees; good or bad, wise or foolish; 
decent or ridiculous; honest or vicious."(XII. p.139) 
But in spite of this nihilistic boasting, Rameau 




























































































epigram about perpetual change, complete ethical 
chaos, this chaos is less than complete, for Rameau 
still wants to demonstrate that he acts on the basis 
of an underlying principle, even though this 
principle sanctions his acting as a perpetual 
chameleon: false or true according to his self- 
interest. Though Rameau purports to be ever changing, 
there is still method in his seeming madness. And 
though the principle is a base one: false or true 
according to circumstance, it is important to Rameau 
that the philosopher recognize him for his 
consistency. And he does; the philosopher admires 
Rameau, for what Goethe described as his "immoral 
moralisin'': for Rameau is no hypocrite, he lives 
according to the principles he espouses. In this way 
his depravity becomes "profound."(XII p. 176)
But this is not the only limit to Rameau's 
ostensible affirmation of moral chaos. Though he says 
he holds the standard, "never false when it serve me 
to be true, never true when it serves me to be 
false," his perfidy leads him to several 




























































































Machiavellianism makes him free, but, in fact, it 
actually enslaves him. For his changing to fit 
whatever circumstances suit him, adopting the cloak 
of virtue and vice as needed, is merely a "beggar's 
pantomime(XII. p. 189) And this is where the 
philosopher is able to reply to Rameau. For unlike 
Rameau, and everyone who takes on a role, the 
philosopher does not play this pantomime; he is the 
only one who is truly free. But more importantly, 
Rameau is also not able to live down to his own 
standard. He is thrown out of the house where he is 
resident buffoon and parasite because he refuses to 
abase himself in front of his masters and plead for 
their forgiveness. The philosopher asks him matter of 
factly, why he does not go and grovel in front of his 
former employers, apologize for his transgressions, 
and seek reinstatement to his position. Rameau 
responds that human dignity is resistant to all 
attempts at enslavement, that even a worm turns when 
trodden upon, that his nature prevented him from 




























































































with man's nature and which nothing can stifle. A 
mere nothing will arouse it."(XII. p. 120)
Should we take Rameau's words at face value here? 
Rameau is also the buffoon who seems not to take any 
principle seriously at all, who delights in provoking 
the philosopher and taunting him at every turn. And 
so, alongside this demand for freedom, he also tells 
the philosopher that he has nothing against 
abasement, provided that it would be abasement on his 
own terms. But here, despite his mockery, Rameau is 
not willing to give up this claim for freedom, for 
abasement with preconditions is not really abasement 
at all. Though Rameau may mock the idea of human 
dignity, he cannot rid himself from it - his 
resistance, after all, is the reason why he is thrown 
out by his masters.
Diderot wrote that he "did not dare to pick 
up a pen and write the first line" of a systematic 
ethical treatise, for he did not think he could 
establish what the philosopher in Rameau's Nephew 
attempts: the equation of happiness with virtue.32 But 




























































































(though he points to the opposite for Rameau's
nihilism does not make him happy, he ends up as quite 
a pathetic character, having lost not only his 
employment, but also his wife as well) his scepticism 
at least points to the limits of doubt. For there are 
two separate elements that Rameau's doubts do not 
corrode: his desire to justify his actions, to act 
consistently according to a guiding principle, and 
his demand for human dignity. And together, these 
principles can form the basis for an ethics.
Kant, of course, claimed that the desire to act 
consistently according to a guiding principle is at 
the foundation of morality: the fundamental rule act 
so that the maxim of your action can be willed to 
become a general law, is in essence a formulation of 
the injunction do not contradict yourself. We also know 
that this formulation has been historically criticized 
- most famously by Hegel, as an empty one, that merely 
to demand consistency of action need not itself serve 
as an argument justifying ethical behavior. Or as 
Rameau attempts to argue, consistency is no guarantee 




























































































thoroughly consistent premises. But Rameau's other 
principle - his demand for human dignity
circumscribes the realm of what is permitted if he is 
to remain true to this need for internal consistency. 
For if Rameau wants to justify his actions - to act in 
a coherent manner, and if he wants his own dignity to 
be recognized, than he would have no choice but to 
recognize the dignity of others. Out of the dialogue 
which Hegel deemed to be the example of
disintegrating consciousness, instead, we find the 
latent seeds of Hegel's conception of recognition as 
the basis of ethics.
Of course, this does not mean that Rameau does 
recognize, or care about the dignity of others in the 
dialogue. He is obviously a scoundrel. But Diderot's 
lesson is that there are contradictions to his own 
perfidy. Though Rameau's doubts seem to free him from 
all moral judgement, he himself provides the ethical 
standards with which to censure his own treachery. In 
this way, we can understand that Rameau's Nephew is not 
the huis clos that some interpreters make it out to be, 




























































































pointing to the limits of moral scepticism, 
demonstrating that morality is more difficult to escape 
than the sceptic may think.
But Rameau's Nephew also help us better understand 
the nature of scepticism in other ways. Rameau easily 
falls from a sceptical doubt about the possibility of 
justifying moral beliefs to a dogmatic denial of this 
possibility itself: his doubt almost immediately 
becomes dogmatic. First he says that he is sceptical, 
or rather uncertain about the nature of moral belief, 
but then he goes beyond this doubt to a dogmatic 
affirmation that all that underlies moral belief is 
merely power. This shift not only points to the 
inescapability of moral judgement and moral belief, a 
necessity from which scepticism does not free - a 
lesson which critics of scepticism have pointed out for 
centuries, objecting that total scepticism is not 
possible - but it also indicates the slipperiness and 
instability of scepticism itself. Though complete 
scepticism or agnosticism on moral questions may not be 
possible, even an incomplete scepticism is very 




























































































scepticism, as the doubt about the possibility of 
justifying moral and political belief, is an obligation 
to continually keep questioning all beliefs that we 
encounter. And that is hard work. Consequently, we 
should not be surprised to see that scepticism may 
easily decay into dogmatism, that doubt may be replaced 
by unquestioning belief. And so, Rameau's lesson is 
not only that morality is inescapable, but also that he 
who wishes to adopt scepticism should understand that 
it is a very difficult task.
Finally, in the spirit of Diderot's avowal that 
the true sceptic would be one who calls into question 
all belief, we still need to ask one question. How is 
it possible for Diderot to affirm the principles of 
consistency and the principle of human dignity, and at 
the same time claim to be a sceptic - the true or 
honest sceptic at all? Does not this make his 
scepticism, rather than mitigated, merely inconsistent?
We might be correct in pointing to inconsistencies in 
Diderot's scepticism, but we will not find them here. 
Every sceptic is subject to inconsistencies, for it is 




























































































upon all questions. And Diderot is no exception. When 
he claims that the true sceptic should not submit his 
judgement to anyone, it is clear that Diderot is not 
merely advocating a neutral method of questioning, but 
that he believes - without question - in the principle 
of freedom, a freedom that is not merely intellectual 
but political as well. And this is clear from 
Diderot's Encylopédie article "Autorité", which 
incited enough official disapprobation to put the 
whole project at risk, where Diderot argues that 
political authority is derived from the consent of 
the people themselves, rather than from nature or 
force. But here on the question of human dignity, 
Diderot is not inconsistent with his scepticism. 
Diderot once wrote "one may demand of me that I look 
for the truth, but not that I find it." (II. p.28) 
And in Rameau's Nephew Diderot follows this tenet. He 
does not find a non-sceptical rational justification 
of ethics: he does not establish on what grounds 
Rameau is able to appeal to human dignity. But that 
is not his purpose - as he himself cautioned, he was 




























































































might provide such an answer. In Rameau's Nephew, 
Diderot instead only demonstrates that while we may 
be full of doubt about how human dignity may be 
established, it is far more difficult to rid 
ourselves of this principle then we might think. And 
in our postmodern times, where there is still no 
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